Contrary to a widespread assumption, a recent study suggested that adults do not solve very small additions by directly retrieving their answer from memory, but rely instead on highly automated and fast counting procedures (Barrouillet & Thevenot, 2013). The aim of the present study was to test the hypothesis that these automated compiled procedures are restricted to small quantities that do not exceed the size of the focus of attention (i.e., 4 elements). For this purpose, we analyzed the response times of ninety adult participants when solving the 81 additions with operands from 1 to 9. Even when focusing on small problems (i.e. with sums 610) reported by participants as being solved by direct retrieval, chronometric analyses revealed a strong size effect. Response times increased linearly with the magnitude of the operands testifying for the involvement of a sequential multistep procedure. However, this size effect was restricted to the problems involving operands from 1 to 4, whereas the pattern of response times for other small problems was compatible with a retrieval hypothesis. These findings suggest that very fast responses routinely interpreted as reflecting direct retrieval of the answer from memory actually subsume compiled automated procedures that are faster than retrieval and deliver their answer while the subject remains unaware of their process, mistaking them for direct retrieval from long-term memory.
Introduction
The associative nature of memory is the object of a large consensus in cognitive psychology. As Anderson (1974) noted, the idea that objects or thoughts that have been experienced in close contiguity become associated in memory (Thorndike, 1922) , and that these associations govern the subsequent recollection of these objects or thoughts can be traced back to Aristotle in his essay ''On memory and reminiscence". Nonetheless, modern theories went further than Aristotle's insights and no longer view memory as a muddled depository of imprints left by experienced contiguities, but as hierarchically structured systems that store organized bundles of associations (e.g., Anderson, 1974; Anderson, 1993; Collins & Quillian, 1972) . These neo-associationist theories also suppose that associations can bind together elements that are not necessarily perceived, but also produced by mental computation (Anderson, 1993) . The recurrent solving of a problem is assumed to lead to the association in memory of this problem with its answer, an associative process seen as highly adaptive because it is assumed that directly retrieving answers from memory would provide us with faster and more accurate responses than any algorithmic reconstructive process (Logan, 1988) .
This theoretical framework has found one of its most perfect fields of application in the domain of mental arithmetic and simple addition problem solving. Before any systematic tuition in primary school, children develop a variety of counting strategies for solving simple additions. These strategies that initially rely on manipulatives (objects or fingers) become rapidly internalized as verbal counting. Eventually, solving frequently encountered problems by counting procedures leads to their association in long-term memory with the computed answers, adult performance being characterized by the subsequent retrieval of these problemanswer associations. Consequently, development would take the form of a progressive shift from algorithmic problem solving to direct retrieval. The aim of this article is to put this conventional wisdom of cognitive psychology under scrutiny.
Retrieval of associations in mental arithmetic
A popular application of the associationist framework outlined above is probably the distribution of associations model proposed by Siegler and Shrager (1984) ⇑ Corresponding author at: Université de Genève, Faculté de Psychologie et des
